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Between 1960 and 1980, the United States made
significant progress in narrowing the earnings
gap between whites and blacks. Unfortunately,
the last two decades have not been as success-
ful. In 1997, the median income for whites was
$47,100; for blacks, it was a much lower $26,500.
This difference is not uniform across the coun-
try, however. Studies show that although blacks
have made the largest strides in the South, the
pay gap is still widest there (Murphy and Welch
[1990]). This article examines some of the major
reasons why blacks’ earnings continue to lag
whites’ and why this problem is especially acute
in the southern states. 
In the broadest sense, we hope that a
greater understanding of the factors driving
white–black pay differentials at the regional
level will help explain some of the disparities at
the national level. Such knowledge is clearly
applicable to a wide variety of important public
policy issues. In the narrower sense of mone-
tary policy, we seek to enlarge the knowledge
base on which policy decisions are made. The
ability to explain patterns of labor compensa-
tion is central to many debates about labor
markets, productivity growth, and inflation
dynamics. Furthermore, the regional nature of
much discussion surrounding real-time policy
decisions—a notable public example being the
Federal Reserve System’s regularly published
Beige Book—suggests the importance of under-
standing how earnings patterns across groups
and geographic areas compare with those typi-
cally found in aggregate analyses. 
Previous studies of earnings disparities be-
tween groups have followed Oaxaca (1973),
which decomposes wage variations into their
explained and unexplained components. Under
the null hypothesis, explained differences are
typically interpreted as reflecting differences in
productivity, while unexplained differences are
loosely associated with discrimination. These
studies account for regional variations through
the use of dummy variables—a method that
presumes identical wage-determination
processes across all regions. As a result, stan-
dard wage decompositions provide aggregated
measures, but only limited information about
earnings and discrimination within particular
areas of the country.
This article differs from earlier studies in
that it focuses specifically on decomposing
regional wage differentials. The regions con-
sidered here are the South and non-South. Our
approach is a natural extension of the Oaxaca
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decomposition. Running separate wage regres-
sions for whites and blacks is equivalent to in-
teracting race with the independent variables.
Similarly, estimating separate regressions for
the South and non-South enables the research-
er to analyze white–black wage differentials
without assuming the same wage equation for
both regions.
The Oaxaca decomposition has several limi-
tations. While unexplained differences are gen-
erally thought to measure discrimination, they
may not do so accurately. Likewise, explained
differences may be due to discrimination rather
than to differences in productivity. Therefore,
caution must be used in classifying the reasons
behind existing wage disparities. A good ap-
proach is to look at our findings as a piece of a
much larger puzzle that policymakers and
economists can use to better understand the
determinants of earnings. 
The article proceeds as follows: Section I
introduces the Oaxaca decomposition used for
identifying white–black wage differentials.
Section II discusses the limitations of this ap-
proach. To help understand the empirical results
covered later, section III provides an overview
of discrimination theory. The final sections then
specify and estimate U.S. and regional wage
models, discuss these results in light of discrimi-
nation theory, and summarize our key findings
regarding the determinants of wage differentials
and the nature of the earnings gap.
I. Decomposition
Methodology
One of the reasons for developing the Oaxaca
decomposition was to quantify the amount of
discrimination in the marketplace. Market dis-
crimination occurs when individuals with the
same productivity are paid different wages. Pro-
ductivity, however, is not observable. 
For discrimination to be appropriately cap-
tured by the Oaxaca decomposition, the follow-
ing conditions must be satisfied: 1) The factors
that determine productivity (education, for
example) can be completely identified; and 
2) these factors are accurately measured. Given
these conditions, one can estimate what portion
of the wage differential is due to productivity
and what portion is due to discrimination.
The Oaxaca approach involves estimating
separate wage equations for different groups,
such as whites and blacks, and then decompos-
ing the pay gaps into explained and unex-
plained portions. Explained differences are said
to be attributable to productivity factors, such as
experience and education, while unexplained
differences are said to result from discrimina-
tion, as already defined. The conceptual frame-
work for this analysis is presented below.
The average wage gap between whites and
blacks is given by





where the carets over the W’s represent the
average wage of whites and blacks. Equation
(1), then, is simply the percentage difference
between white and black wages. Regression
equations for whites and blacks are defined as 
(2) ln(W W) = XWbW + e
ln(WB) = XBbB + e,
whereW represents wages, X is the vector of
the regressors, and b is the corresponding vec-
tor of estimated coefficients (Oaxaca and
Ransom [1994]). Within this framework, the
geometric means (approximately equal to the
arithmetic means) of the equations are as fol-
lows (b’s represent the ordinary-least-squares











To understand the earnings disparity be-
tween whites and blacks better, it is important
to distinguish between differences that can be
explained by variations in the explanatory vari-
ables and differences that are unexplainable.
There are two ways of decomposing equa-
tion (3) into its explained and unexplained
components. The first decomposition, referred
to as “whites as base,” assumes that in the
absence of discrimination, the wage structure
(and hence productivity) for both races is given
by the estimated coefficients for whites.
























B (bW – bB ).
The alternative (“blacks as base”) assumes
that the true relationship governing productivity
for both groups is given by the regression esti-
mates for blacks. 
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By construction, the total wage gap between
whites and blacks is independent of the meth-
od selected. The portions that fall under “ex-
plained” and “unexplained” may be different,
however. The first term of equations (4) and (5)
is the explained component. It is represented
by differences in the means of the explanatory
variables, X, and measures the part of the wage
difference that arises because blacks are under-
represented in high-paying, skilled occupations
or have less education on average than whites.
These differences are said to be “explained”
because they represent the wage differential
that stems from differences in productivity aris-
ing from observed differences in education,
tenure, experience, occupation, and so on.
The second term of equations (4) and (5) is
the unexplained, or potentially discriminatory,
portion. It arises whenever the returns to
whites and blacks differ for given values of an
explanatory variable, including the intercept.
Because measurable characteristics and job
qualities account for only a part of the wage
gap, the remaining differential is often assumed
to result from discrimination.




The Oaxaca decomposition employs many
assumptions designed to measure discrimina-
tion. Unfortunately, in the real world, some of
these may be invalid. It is important to under-
stand why the explained and unexplained
components of the Oaxaca decomposition 
may not capture productivity differences and
discrimination.
One reason for including explanatory vari-
ables such as female, firm size, and region is
that they empirically affect wages. Another rea-
son is that differences in the means of some
explanatory variables may reflect discrimination
rather than individual choice. For example,
blacks may be denied promotions or be “segre-
gated” into lower-paying occupations and
industries.1  Similarly, blacks’ shorter tenure
may be the result of more frequent layoffs.
Differences in educational achievement
between whites and blacks may also arise
because of premarket versus workplace dis-
crimination. That is, even before blacks enter
the workforce, their potential to earn a degree
may be limited. If, for example, blacks receive
substandard schooling at the primary and sec-
ondary levels, they may have fewer opportuni-
ties to attend college.
While differences in the explained compo-
nent may in fact result from discrimination, the
unexplained component may not reflect dis-
crimination. This can occur if the wage model
is mis-specified; that is, if an important variable
that affects productivity is omitted. Economists
who study male–female wage disparities fre-
quently confront this problem. A researcher
may conclude that women are discriminated
against when, in fact, the gap between men’s
and women’s earnings reflects differences in
some unobservable variable, such as turnover,
or other types of compensating differentials.
To understand these results better, it is useful
to discuss the economics of discrimination. This
gives the researcher some direction as to what
factors may help disentangle the components




Becker (1971) provided the first analysis of the
economics of discrimination. He posited that, in
general, competition tends to eliminate wage
differences arising from discrimination. The
reason, he said, is that firms must forgo profits
in order to discriminate. Any profits will be
eliminated as nondiscriminatory firms enter the
market to capture these windfalls. Thus, for dis-
criminatory wage differences to exist, there can
be few actual or potential nondiscriminatory
firms. That is, most firms must have a prefer-
ence to discriminate.
One prediction of this theory is that discrimi-
natory wage differences will be lower in more
competitive labor markets. For example, in
urban areas, where there are many different job
and product opportunities, white–black wage
differentials resulting from discrimination
should be lower than in rural areas, where
fewer opportunities exist.
Even if firms prefer not to discriminate, the-
ory predicts that they might if their customers
wish to do so. If this conjecture is true, dis-
crimination would be more prevalent in jobs
with a high degree of direct customer contact.
Examples of such positions include sales
workers, beauty shop employees, teachers,
doctors, and lawyers. Furthermore, this theory
implies that racial discrimination will be lower
in areas where the fraction of minority cus-
tomers is large.
n 1 Sorensen (1989) argues that women and minorities are “crowded
out” of higher-paying jobs.
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IV. Model
Specification
Our model includes the usual independent
variables that, under the null hypothesis, col-
lectively control for individual productivity
differences: female, subregions, education,
potential experience (exp), experience squared
(exp 2), experience cubed (exp 3), experience
quartic (exp4), industry (ind), firm size (size),
union, occupation (occ), tenure (ten), tenure
squared (ten2), tenure cubed (ten 3), tenure
quartic (ten4), metropolitan residence (MSA),
and marital status (ms).2
We measure educational attainment by the
highest level of schooling completed: high
school dropout, high school/GED, some
college/vocational training, college, postgradu-
ate (M.A.), professional, and doctorate. Because
of limitations in the Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, information on actual work experi-
ence is not available. Therefore, we use poten-
tial experience, measured as age minus school-
ing minus six, as an approximation.3  Murphy
and Welch (1990) argue that the traditional
model, which includes only experience and its
square, is mis-specified and that a quartic speci-
fication fits the earnings equation best.
To analyze the wage implications of indus-
tries, we define five groups: miscellaneous serv-
ices (ind1); manufacturing, transportation, com-
munications, and public utilities (ind2); hospital
and medical services (ind3); retail trade (ind4);
and finance, insurance, and real estate, or FIRE
(ind5).4  To assess the wage effects of occupa-
tion, we define six other groups: executive,
administrative, and managerial (occ1); profes-
sional specialty (occ2); sales workers (occ3);
service workers (occ4); machine operators,
assemblers, and inspectors (occ5); and trans-
portation and material moving (occ6).5
We also include a firm size variable repre-
senting companies with 1,000 or more employ-
ees. Previous studies indicate that large compa-
nies pay substantially more than their smaller
counterparts. One possible reason is that large
companies attract more productive workers.
Other research has shown that large companies
offer efficiency wages to maintain their highly
skilled workforce and to reduce worker turn-
over (Salop [1979]; Bulow and Summers
[1986])6 or that they pay higher wages to avoid
unionization (Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff
[1990]). Union status itself, a potentially impor-
tant variable, is measured by coverage by a
union contract.
Tenure with one’s current employer is also
included, since human capital theory suggests
that earnings differences can be accounted for
by the types and levels of investment in formal
or on-the-job training. As was the case for
experience, we assume a quartic specification
for this variable.
MSA serves as a proxy for urbanization, pro-
viding a measure of regional size and competi-
tion. The demographic variable “marital status”
is equal to one if an individual has ever been
married. All else equal, married females tend to
earn less than their single counterparts, while
the opposite holds true for males (Berndt
[1991]). The interaction between female and
marriage measures the differential impact that
marriage has on women’s wages. 
The explanatory variables already men-
tioned are included in the model below. We
have chosen earnings as the dependent vari-
able because policy debate has focused specif-
ically on this factor.7
X = (Subregions, Education, Experience,
Experience2, Experience3,Experience4,
Industry, Occupation, Firm Size,
Union, Tenure, Tenure 2, Tenure 3,
Tenure4, MSA, Female, Marital Status,
Female 3 Marriage);  
and b is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients.8
(6) ln(Earnings) = Xb + e.
n 2 Omitted conditions for all variables are as follows: female: male;
education: high school dropout; industry: mining, construction, wholesale
trade, private household, forestry and fisheries, public administration, edu-
cational services, social services, and other professional services; firm
size: fewer than 1,000 workers; union: not covered by a union contract or
no response; occupation: administrative support, including clerical, tech-
nical, and related support, handlers, equipment cleaners, and farming,
forestry, and fishing; MSA: not a metropolitan area; and marital status:
never married.
n 3 For a complete discussion of the CPS measurements and their
limitations, see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Employment and
Earnings, any year.
n 4 The use of industry dummies at the one-digit rather than the two-
or three-digit level may introduce an aggregate bias. 
n 5 Listings of detailed occupations used in the CPS are published in
Employment and Earnings, January 1994, for occupations with 50,000 or
more workers. Other listings (unpublished data) can also be obtained from
the BLS.
n 6 See Katz (1986) for an overview of the literature. 
n 7 Similar results were obtained when the decomposition was done
using both earnings and earnings divided by hours worked. 
n 8 The intercept term is excluded, since each region estimated
includes all of its subregions.
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Data and 
Methodology
Different, but equivalent, regressions can be es-
timated to calculate the coefficients necessary
for a Oaxaca decomposition. For example, in-
cluding interactions between race and the inde-
pendent variables is equivalent to estimating
separate wage regressions for whites and blacks.
Figure 1 illustrates these alternatives as well as
the basic methodology used in this research.
To estimate our model, we pool regions,
whites, and blacks into a single regression with
interactions between region, race, and the
explanatory variables (see figure 1, part C). This
provides a straightforward way to determine
the b’s for the Oaxaca decomposition and to
test whether differences in these estimates,
across both regions and races, are significant.9
The estimates that follow are obtained by
using cross-sectional microdata from the Public
Use Sample of the April 1993 CPS, conducted
by the Census Bureau. Wage equations for
whites and blacks are estimated separately for
the South and the rest of the country.10  The
sample contains full-time (35 or more hours
per week), private, nonagricultural employees
between the ages of 25 and 54.11  The focus on
year-round, full-time workers “minimizes earn-
ings fluctuations due to business cycles” and




Before estimating decompositions for the South
and non-South, we first estimate a standard
U.S. decomposition.12  This will increase our
understanding of wage differentials at the
national level and will provide a reference for
the regional decompositions. Table 1 presents
the average wage gap between whites and
blacks, breaking it down into its explained and
unexplained components. The total wage dif-
ferential (using whites as base) is estimated to
be 32.7 percent, while the unexplained compo-
nent accounts for 12.9 percent. 
The explained component (variations in the
means) accounts for 19.8 percentage points of
the total differential. One contributing factor is
education, which accounts for nearly 4 percent-
age points of the wage disparity between
whites and blacks.
The single most important factor contribut-
ing to the explained portion of the white–black
wage differential is occupation. The reason is
























































n 9 Although parameter estimates are identical among the three
regressions, standard errors may vary. In this study, differences in standard
errors are minimal.
n 10 The South, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, includes
three divisions: the South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, the District of
Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida), the East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, and Mississippi), and the West South Central (Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas).
n 11 Individuals earning an average hourly wage of less than $1 or
more than $60 are considered outliers and are eliminated from the sample
(see Anderson and Shapiro [1996]). The age restriction is an attempt to
capture individuals who have completed their education but have not yet
retired (those in their career stages).
n 12 Regional dummies include all the major U.S. regions: South,
Northeast, Midwest, and West. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q215
paying jobs. Indeed, executive, administrative,
and managerial positions (occ1) account for
almost half (2.8 percentage points) of the total
explained differential arising from occupation
(5.7 percentage points). This is the highest-paid
group, with workers earning over 6 percent
more than those in the professional specialty
category. Only 12 percent of blacks hold
managerial–administrative positions, compared
to more than 22 percent of whites. 
MSA accounts for another 3.0 percentage
points of the explained differential (using
whites as base). On average, whites earn 14
percent more in urban areas than in rural com-
munities. At the same time, 48 percent of
employed whites and 27 percent of employed
blacks live in urban areas. Assuming a black
wage structure, however, the contribution of
MSA to the explained component drops to only
0.9 percent. This occurs because blacks in
urban areas earn only 4.5 percent more than
their rural counterparts.
Nationwide, only MSA and miscellaneous
services (ind1) contribute significantly to the
unexplained portion of the wage gap. The 9.7
percent less earned by blacks relative to whites
in urban areas is the reason MSA’s contribution
to the explained component depends on the
assumed wage structure (white versus black)
and also explains why MSA is an important fac-
tor in the unexplained component. Its 2.6-
percentage-point contribution to the 12.9 per-
cent total unexplained wage differential is sur-
prising, since one expects metropolitan areas to
provide more competition, which in turn
should discourage discriminatory hiring and
work practices and support more equal wages. 
Miscellaneous services (ind1) accounts for
2.4 percentage points of the nearly 13 percent
unexplained wage difference between the
races. Although its total contribution is not par-
ticularly large, blacks in this category earn
nearly 34 percent less than whites. This sizable
gap reflects the small share of blacks (7 per-




The sources of white–black wage differences
are not the same inside the South as outside.
Tables 2 and 3 show decompositions for both
regions.13  The total wage difference between
n 13 Interesting differences may exist outside the South, but the
small number of nonsouthern blacks in the CPS sample makes further dis-
aggregation inappropriate. 
T A B L E 1
Decomposition of 
Wage Differentials: U.S.
Total wage difference = 32.7%
Percent Percent
explained unexplained
Whites Blacks Variable Whites Blacks
Variable as base as base (Race 3) as base as base
All  19.8 20.7  All 12.9 12.0
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Education 3.9 3.9  Ind1 2.4 2.1 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupation 5.7 5.6 MSA 2.6 4.7
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.08) (0.08)
Tenure 1.5 1.8
(0.0001) (0.0001)
MSA 3.0  0.9 
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Marital status 2.0 0.1
(0.0001) (0.0001)
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference. P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 2
Decomposition of Wage 
Differentials: South
Total wage difference = 34.2%
Percent Variable Percent
Variable explained (Race 3) unexplained
All  19.0 All 15.2
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Education 5.0 Ind1 1.6
(0.0001) (0.07)
Occupation 6.3 Occ2 –0.7
(0.0001) (0.66)
Tenure 0.4 Firm size –9.5
(0.0001) (0.09)
MSA 3.4  Tenure –9.5
(0.0001) (0.43)
Female 1.6 MSA 2.8
(0.11) (0.10)
Marital status 2.4 Female 5.5
(0.004) (0.48)
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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whites and blacks averages 34.2 percent in the
South, compared to 25.2 percent outside. Nearly
half of this difference can be traced to the ex-
plained components. In the South, 19.0 percent
of the earnings disparity is explained, while in
the non-South that share drops to 15.8 percent.
Reporting just the sum of the explained
components, however, masks important region-
al differences. For example, occupation con-
tributes 6.3 percentage points to the explained
component in the South, but only 2.3 percent-
age points in the non-South. This situation is
reversed for tenure, which contributes 0.4 per-
centage point in the South but 4.6 percentage
points outside the South. These patterns occur
because of important differences in the repre-
sentation of blacks in certain occupations and
in the average length of tenure between whites
and blacks in the two regions.
Table 4 illustrates these disparities. Southern
blacks are underrepresented in the highest-
paying occupation (administrative–managerial)
and disproportionately represented in the
lowest-paying one (operatives). These differ-
ences are virtually nonexistent in the rest of the
country. On the other hand, tenure levels in the
South are nearly identical between the races,
while in the non-South blacks average over a
year less on their current jobs.
Tables 2 and 3 indicate that educational dif-
ferences between the races explain 5.0 per-
centage points of the white–black wage gap 
in the South and 3.8 percentage points outside
the South. Despite the similarity of these num-
bers, table 4 shows that blacks have strikingly
different patterns of educational attainment in
the South versus the non-South. These differ-
ences are not captured if one considers just the
mean years of education for blacks in the two
regions (13.3 years in the South, 13.5 years in
the non-South).
Substantially more blacks attend college out-
side the South than in the South—71 percent
versus 50 percent. Interestingly, though, more
blacks in the South obtain their four-year college
degree (26.8 percent, compared to 21.8 percent
outside the South). This occurs because 54 per-
cent of blacks who attend college in the South
obtain at least a bachelor’s degree, while only 31
percent of blacks outside the South do. If blacks
in the non-South completed college at the 
same rate as their counterparts in the South, our
model indicates that their wages would increase
by 2.3 percentage points, narrowing the white–
black earnings gap to 22.9 percent. The share of
the white–black wage differential that is unex-
plained is 15.2 percent in the South and 9.4 per-
cent in the non-South—both highly significant.
T A B L E 3
Decomposition of Wage 
Differentials: Non-South
Total wage difference = 25.2%
Percent Variable Percent
Variable explained (Race 3) unexplained
All  15.8 All 9.4
(0.0001) (0.01)
Education 3.8 Ind1 2.5
(0.0001) (0.09)
Occupation 2.3 Occ2 3.9
(0.0001) (0.02)
Tenure 4.6 Firm size –2.8
(0.0001) (0.68)
MSA 1.5 Tenure –22.5
(0.0001) (0.07)
Female 2.3 MSA 2.8
(0.002) (0.38)
Marital status 1.8 Female 20.1
(0.0001) (0.07)
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
T A B L E 4
Representation of Whites 
and Blacks in Sample (percent)
South Non-South 
Variable Whites Blacks Whites Blacks
Education
High school or less 37.6 50.2 34.8 28.9
Some college 28.6 23.0 29.7 49.3
College grad or higher 33.8 26.8 35.5 21.8
Occupation
Highest paying 19.3 8.7 23.4 19.0
Lowest paying 6.8 17.4 5.2 2.8
Tenure (mean years) (9.2) (9.1) (8.7) (7.5)
MSA 44.7 21.9 49.7 36.6
Female 45.0 60.0 44.5 62.7
Marital status 86.0 69.4 84.4 71.1
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference. Mean years of tenure are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Unexplained Wage
Differentials
Tables 2 and 3 also report the breakdown for
the independent variables in which unex-
plained wage differences are significant in one
or both regions. Only miscellaneous services
(ind1), which was important for the U.S. as a
whole, is significant in both the South and non-
South, accounting for 1.6 and 2.5 percentage
points of the unexplained differences, respec-
tively. Within that occupational category, blacks
earn 25 percent less than their white counter-
parts in the South and 30 percent less than
whites outside the South (see table 5). 
The biggest difference between the two
regions occurs within the professional specialty
category (occ2). In the South, occ2 does not
account for any of the unexplained component
of the white–black wage differential, whereas
in the non-South it accounts for 3.9 percentage
points of the 9.4 percent unexplained wage
gap. This is because within this occupation
blacks outside the South earn an average of 37
percent less than whites (see table 5). In the
South, the sign is reversed but insignificant. 
The difference in the way whites and blacks
are rewarded within professional specialty oc-
cupations is highly significant (p-value = 0.04)
and impacts the two regions’ race-based pay
gaps. Excluding this category, the unexplained
earnings disparity in the non-South drops to 5.6
percent and becomes insignificant. This is in
sharp contrast to the 15.9 percent unexplained
pay differential seen in the South when this
group is excluded (see table 6).
In the South, the variable with the greatest
impact on the unexplained pay component is
firm size. Whites working in large firms earn
3.9 percent more than those working in small
firms, but the earnings differential for blacks is
much greater—16.3 percent. The pay differ-
ence between whites and blacks in large firms
is 10.4 percent and is insignificant (see table 6);
in small firms, that share jumps to 25.7 percent. 
One commonly held belief is that the narrow-
ing of the white–black wage gap between 1960
and 1980 is attributable to antidiscrimination
laws and the genesis of affirmative action pro-
grams. The substantial premium associated with
firm size in the South could occur if large firms
there are policed much more closely than small
firms or if the laws are enforced unequally.
MSA is significant only in the South, but con-
tributes 2.8 percent to the total unexplained
wage differential in both regions (see tables 2
and 3). This occurs because a much greater
share of working blacks outside the South live





(Race 3) South South Difference
Ind1 –0.25 –0.30 0.05
(0.07) (0.09) (0.84)
Occ2 0.06 –0.37 0.43
(0.66) (0.02) (0.04)
Firm size 0.12 0.04 0.08
(0.09) (0.68) (0.49)
MSA –0.13 –0.077 –0.063
(0.10) (0.38) (0.66)
Female –0.09 –0.32 0.23
(0.48) (0.07) (0.30)
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.




Variable South South Difference
All 15.2 9.4 5.8
(0.0001) (0.01) (0.24)
All – Occ2 15.9 5.6 10.3
(0.0001) (0.18) (0.06)
All – Ind2 13.6 6.9 6.7
(0.0002) (0.09) (0.20)
Males 20.1 6.5 13.6
(0.0001) (0.28) (0.08)
Females 11.9 11.2 0.7
(0.004) (0.02) (0.90)
Urban 22.1 10.3 11.8
(0.0005) (0.09) (0.18)
Rural 13.1 4.2 8.9
(0.0003) (0.73) (0.51)
Large firms 10.4 7.0 3.4
(0.17) (0.12) (0.70)
Small firms 25.7 15.6 10.1
(0.0001) (0.03) (0.28)
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage 
difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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in urban areas (36.6 percent versus 21.9 per-
cent; see table 4). The importance of MSA in the
South may arise because blacks make up more
than 50 percent of the rural population there,
but only 22 percent of the urban population.
The next section takes a closer look at the
reasons behind these regional differences. It
also attempts to ascertain whether some of the
explained and unexplained differences are due




By analyzing the apparent differences between
the two regions, this section illustrates why
teasing out discrimination is so difficult. Tables
2 and 3 show that in the non-South, blacks
gain significantly more than whites from an
additional year on the job (p-value = 0.07),
and black women earn 32 percent less than
comparable black men. In the South, there is
no significant difference for either variable. Al-
though our strict interpretation of the null is
that discrimination in the non-South is associ-
ated with black women only, there are alterna-
tive explanations.
Table 4 shows that the non-South is also the
region with important tenure differences be-
tween the races. In the South, tenure levels for
whites and blacks are almost identical, with no
differential return. This suggests that certain un-
observable characteristics may cause higher
turnover and hence lower wages for blacks in
the non-South. As blacks accumulate time on
the job, the importance of this unobservable
diminishes.
Evidence suggests that, on average, women
have weaker attachments to the labor force
than do men and as a result earn less. Firms,
however, probably cannot tell at the time of
hire which women are more likely to stay.
Since turnover is costly, firms must be compen-
sated whenever they hire someone they believe
will have a greater chance of leaving. A woman
may initially start out at a lower salary than a
man doing the same job, but should corre-
spondingly gain more per additional year of
tenure. Women should then be compensated as
they slowly reveal themselves to be “stayers.” 
The large return to blacks from tenure, cou-
pled with the large negative return to black
women, suggests a connection between the
two. For example, black women may have a
weaker attachment to the labor force than do
black men, and this difference may be greater
than it is for whites. To investigate whether this
explanation can account for the unusually large
returns to tenure and the small returns to black
women, we break the black-tenure interaction
into its male and female components. The
T A B L E 7
Non-South Parameter Estimates for
Black 3 Tenure and 3 Female
Original
Variable Parameter Variable Parameter Variable Parameter
(Black 3) estimates (Black 3 male) estimates (Black 3 female) estimates
All tenure a –0.225 All tenure a –0.0153 All tenure a –0.3431
(0.07) (0.80) (0.04)
Ten 0.1246 Ten 0.0015 Ten 0.1969
(0.10) (0.99) (0.04)
Ten2 –0.0155 Ten2 –0.0034 Ten2 –0.0226
(0.14) (0.88) (0.09)
Ten3 0.0007 Ten3 0.0003 Ten3 0.00087
(0.20) (0.81) (0.19)
Ten4 –0.000009 Ten4 –0.000006 Ten4 –0.0000106
(0.27) (0.78) (0.30)
Female –0.32 Black 3 –0.672
(0.07) female (0.02)
a. This estimate is the unexplained component for tenure.
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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expectation is that black tenure will be signifi-
cant for women and insignificant for men.
Table 7 confirms this suspicion, showing that
black females gain more than whites for extra
years on the job, while the returns to tenure for
black males and whites are nearly equal.14 In
other words, tenure helps equalize the wage
difference between white and black females
but not between white and black males. As a
result, the black female coefficient falls even
further and becomes more significant. Before
interactions with tenure, black women earn 32
percent less than white women; afterward, they
earn 67 percent less. This is because of the 34
percent that tenure adds to the wages of black
females compared to whites. The average wage
difference is about 33 percent, close to the 32
percent estimated before allowing interactions.
Because the importance of tenure and female
in the non-South could be due to model mis-
specification, the unexplained differences may
not reflect labor market discrimination. 
Table 8 shows the same experiment for the
South. Unlike earlier (table 5), the black female
coefficient is now highly significant and nearly
identical to that of the non-South. Therefore, the
surprising finding that black women earn less
than black men in the non-South could reason-
ably be attributed to model mis-specification.
Tables 7 and 8 reveal that the major difference
between the two regions with regard to tenure
is that tenure offers a larger return to blacks in
the non-South than in the South. This may
reflect the greater tenure differences between
whites and blacks in the non-South.
If the return to black females is indeed due
to model misspecification, then perhaps the
unexplained returns to black males is a better
indicator of potential discrimination. If these dif-
ferentials are interpreted as reflecting discrimi-
nation, we would conclude that discrimination
is important in the South (the unexplained com-
ponent is 20.1 percent and is highly significant
[p-value = 0.0001]) but not outside the South. If
this interpretation is correct, there is little evi-
dence to suggest that non-South discrimination
is important, since the unexplained return is
only 6.5 percent and is insignificant.
The single most important factor contribut-
ing to the explained wage differences between
whites and blacks is occupation—6.3 percent
in the South and 2.3 percent outside the South.
Although these differences are “explained,” as
mentioned before, they may reflect discrimina-
tion if blacks are segregated into lower-paying
occupations. Probit estimates indicate that edu-
cational differences between whites and blacks
in the non-South can explain why 19 percent of
blacks are in the highest-paying occupations
n 14 We also tried an interaction between female and tenure for whites,
but it was insignificant; therefore, we use whites as the reference group.
T A B L E 8
South Parameter Estimates for 
Black 3 Tenure and 3 Female
Original
Variable Parameter Variable Parameter Variable Parameter
(Black 3) estimates (Black 3 male) estimates (Black 3 female) estimates
All tenure a 0.095 All tenure a –0.473 All tenure a 0.147
(0.43) (0.02) (0.46)
Ten –0.023 Ten –0.187 Ten 0.272
(0.73) (0.06) (0.05)
Ten2 0.002 Ten2 –0.022 Ten2 –0.033
(0.78) (0.08) (0.10)
Ten3 –0.0001 Ten3 0.001 Ten3 0.0014
(0.78) (0.09) (0.18)
Ten4 –0.000002 Ten4 –0.00001 Ten4 –0.000002
(0.80) (0.11) (0.31)
Female –0.092 Black 3 –0.742
(0.48) female (0.03)
a. This estimate is the unexplained component for tenure.
NOTE: Variables presented contribute most to explaining the total wage difference (whites as base). P-values are given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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(occ1), compared to 23.4 percent of whites
(p-value = 0.49). This is not the case in the
South. Even after controlling for educational
differences, blacks are significantly less likely
than whites to work in occ1 (p-value =
0.0002). This provides some ammunition for
the argument that blacks are more likely to be
segregated into lower-paying jobs in the South
than in other areas of the country.
Another argument is that differences in
white–black tenure levels in the non-South
may reflect discrimination (that is, the 4.6-
percentage-point “explained” tenure difference
is due to discrimination). This could arise if
blacks in the non-South are fired “without
cause” more often than are whites. Basically,
the question is whether wages between whites
and blacks adjust more freely in the South,
whereas quantities adjust more freely in the
non-South. It is impossible to determine con-
clusively whether tenure differences in the
non-South result from discrimination; however,
the following argument casts doubt on discrim-
ination’s ability to explain the lower tenure lev-
els for blacks in the non-South.
If blacks are being laid off without cause
more frequently in the non-South than in the
South, then one would expect the difference
between potential experience (which is observ-
able) and actual experience (which is not
observable) to be greater in the non-South.
This is because unemployment spells are much
longer for laid-off workers than for those who
quit. If blacks in the non-South are indeed
more likely to be laid off, then they should also
have more interruptions in their work histories.
Thus, the ratio of actual experience to potential
experience for blacks in the non-South would
be lower, or equivalently, the measured returns
to potential experience would be lower. No
such difference should exist in the South, how-
ever. The data show that there is no significant
difference between the returns to potential
experience for whites and blacks in either
region; furthermore, the sign is the opposite of
that expected. This casts doubt on the proposi-
tion that discrimination is reflected in wage dif-
ferences in the South and quantity differences
outside the South.
Another important difference between the
regions is in how whites and blacks are com-
pensated within professional specialty occupa-
tions. Outside the South, whites within this cate-
gory earn significantly more than blacks; in the
South, however, no such difference exists.
Faced with this observation, one might appeal
to discrimination theory and speculate that the
source of the effect is customer-driven discrimi-
nation. The next regression addresses this possi-
bility by examining whether white–black wage
differences within professional specialty occu-
pations outside the South arise because the cat-
egory comprises public jobs. (See the appendix
for groupings of public and nonpublic jobs.)
Rerunning the equation for the non-South
suggests important differences in how blacks
are compensated within this category. In pub-
lic occupations (those with more customer
contact), blacks earn 63.5 percent less than
their white counterparts (p-value = 0.0056); as
table 9 shows, this difference is insignificant in
nonpublic occupations (p-value = 0.35). The
difference between these two figures is only
marginally significant (p-value = 0.11).
VII. Concluding
Thoughts 
There is little evidence to suggest that white–
black wage disparities outside the South cannot
be explained by differences in observable char-
acteristics. The situation is much less clear in
the South, where the significance of the unex-
plained components of the race-based pay gap
is robust. Furthermore, even some of the “ex-
plained” differences in the South suggest the
possibility of workplace discrimination. For ex-
ample, unlike the rest of the nation, the South
cannot attribute blacks’ underrepresentation in
high-paying occupations to differences in ob-
served characteristics like education.
The other major factors driving the lower
wages of blacks in the South are firm size and
location: Blacks working in small firms or ur-
ban areas earn significantly less than compara-
ble whites. It is difficult to determine whether
discrimination is behind either of these unex-
plained wage differences. Although the lesser
amount earned by urban blacks is consistent
with discrimination, it may also arise because
T A B L E 9
Non-South Professional
Specialty Occupation





NOTE: P-values are given in parentheses (whites as base).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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of unobservable differences between rural ver-
sus urban blacks. The difficulties heterogeneity
causes in trying to measure discrimination can-
not be overemphasized; discrimination exists
for both whites and blacks, even after control-
ling for observable characteristics. And evi-
dence suggests that this problem is getting
worse. Income inequality over the last 30 years
has increased for both whites and blacks; how-
ever, it has been especially pronounced for
blacks. Understandably, identifying the true
source of these trends and differentials repre-










Lodging places, except hotels and motels
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services
Beauty shops
Barber shops
Funeral services and crematories
Nonpublic
Advertising
Services to dwellings and other buildings
Personnel supply services
Computer and data processing services
Detective and protective services
Business services
Automotive rental and leasing,
without drivers
Automobile parking and car washes
Automotive repair and related services
Electrical repair shops
Miscellaneous repair services








Health assessment and treating occupations
Teachers, college and university
Teachers, except college and university
Counselors, educational and vocational
Librarians, archivists, and curators
Social scientists and urban planners
Social, recreation, and religious workers
Lawyers and judges
Nonpublic
Engineers, architects, and surveyors
Mathematical and computer scientists
Natural scientists
Writers, artists, entertainers, and athletes
References
Anderson, Deborah, and David Shapiro.
“Racial Differences in Access to High-Paying
Jobs and the Wage Gap between Black and
White Women,” Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review, vol. 49, no. 2 ( January 1996),
pp. 273–86.
Becker, Gary S. The Economics of Discrimina-
tion, 2d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1971.
Berndt, Ernst R. The Practice of Econometrics:
Classic and Contemporary. Reading, Mass.:
Addison–Wesley, 1991, pp. 150–223.
Brown, Charles, James Hamilton, and
James Medoff. Employers Large and Small.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1990.
Bulow, Jeremy I., and Lawrence H.
Summers. “A Theory of Dual Labor Markets
with Application to Industrial Policy, Dis-
crimination, and Keynesian Unemployment,”
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 4, no. 3,
part 1 (July 1986), pp. 376–414.
Katz, Larry. “Efficiency Wage Theories: A Par-
tial Evaluation,” in Stanley Fischer, ed., NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 2d. ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1986.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q222
Levy, Frank, and Richard J. Murnane. “U.S.
Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: 
A Review of Recent Trends and Proposed
Explanations,” Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1992), 
pp. 1333–81.
Murphy, Kevin M., and Finis Welch. “Empiri-
cal Age–Earnings Profiles,” Journal of Labor
Economics, vol. 8, no. 2 (April 1990), 
pp. 202–29.
Oaxaca, Ronald L. “Male–Female Wage Differ-
entials in Urban Labor Markets,” Interna-
tional Economic Review, vol. 14, no. 3 
(October 1973), pp. 693–709.
_____, and Michael R. Ransom. “On Discrimi-
nation and the Decomposition of Wage Dif-
ferentials,” Journal of Econometrics, vol. 61,
no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 5–21.
Salop, Steven. “A Model of the Natural Rate 
of Unemployment,” American Economic
Review, vol. 69, no. 1 (March 1979), 
pp. 117–25. 
Sorensen, Elaine. “The Crowding Hypothesis
and Comparable Worth,” Journal of Human
Resources, vol. 25, no. 1 (February 1989), 
pp. 55–89.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q2